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Abstract 
 
 The published work which forms the basis for consideration of my 
application is The Cornwallis Papers:  The Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in the Southern 
Theatre of the American Revolutionary War (Uckfield: The Naval & Military Press Ltd, 
2010) ("the CP").  Consisting of six volumes, it comprises a corpus of work in which 
each volume deals with a distinct aspect of the southern campaigns.  Volume I deals 
with the Charlestown campaign and the occupation of South Carolina and Georgia; 
volume II with the Battle of Camden and the autumn campaign;  volume III with 
Cornwallis's refitment at Winnsborough; volume IV with the winter campaign in 
North Carolina and the march into Virginia; volume V with the Virginia campaign; 
and volume VI with the occupation, siege and capitulation of Yorktown and 
Gloucester.  
 
 This essay describes the overall place of the CP in the historiography of the 
Revolutionary War.  It goes on to discuss examples of the original contributions to 
history made, on the one hand, by my commentary in the introductory chapters of 
the CP and, on the other, by my voluminous footnotes forming part of it.  The essay 
concludes by drawing on my commentary to re-evaluate the strategy and tactics 
pursued by the British in the southern campaigns. 
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PART 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 It was in 1975, when I was researching the American Revolution, that I came 
upon the Cornwallis Papers in the UK National Archives.  I was much surprised 
that, despite the passage of almost 200 years and the vast extent of literature on the 
Revolution, no one had yet got around to editing and publishing this extraordinarily 
important primary material in so far as it related to the southern campaigns of 1780 
and 1781 ― material that in my estimation was crucial to evaluating the war in the 
south.  I therefore decided to do the job myself. 
 
 A very small part of the material was already in the public domain.  The few 
dispatches between Cornwallis, commanding in the south, and Clinton, the 
Commander-in-Chief, were, for example, published in part in the London Gazette and 
elsewhere during or shortly after the war.  In the nineteenth century Charles Ross 
published brief extracts amounting to 121 pages, and other examples have appeared 
elsewhere, for instance in monographs or local histories such as those by Cashin and 
Robertson, Pancake, and Rogers.1  Other recent works in which brief extracts appear 
                                                 
1   Charles Ross (ed.), Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis (London, 1859), vol. I; Edward 
J Cashin Jr and Heard Robertson, Augusta and the American Revolution: Events in the Georgia Back 
Country 1773-1783 (Augusta: Richmond County Historical Society, 1975), pp. 41-8, 50 and 51; John S 
Pancake, This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1782 (reprint of 1985 edition, 
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include, for example, biographies or partial ones such as those by Bass, Rankin, the 
Wickwires, and Willcox.2   Yet, taken together, the extracts published before my own 
work comprised nothing more than a tiny fraction of the Cornwallis Papers relating 
to the southern campaigns.  Nor, since their lodgement in the UK National Archives, 
was reliance placed on them in a variety of seminal works, whether, for example, 
they be, on the one hand, general accounts such as those by Fortescue, McCrady, 
Ward, Alden, and Mackesy or, on the other, biographies or monographs such as 
those by Robinson, Thayer, Treacy and Nelson.3  The picture began to change on 
publication of the CP, as I shall later describe in this Part. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2003), pp. 81-3, 89, 92-4, 190, and 191; George C Rogers Jr, 
The History of Georgetown County, South Carolina  (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1970), 
pp. 123-33, 136-38, and 142. 
2   Robert D Bass, The Green Dragoon: The Lives of Banastre Tarleton and Mary Robinson (reprint of 1958 
edition, Columbia: Sandlapper Press Inc, 1973), pp. 75, 76, 105-17, 121-25, 139, 140, 142-49, 151, 160, 
167, 168, 175, 176, and 182; Hugh F Rankin, Francis Marion: The Swamp Fox (New York: Thomas Y 
Crowell Company, 1973), pp. 49, 53-5, 65, 67, 73, 74, 78-80, 88, 90, 91, 110-12, 114-16, 121-25, 128, 130, 
134, 140, 145, 190, 203, and 204; Franklin and Mary Wickwire, Cornwallis: The American Adventure 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1970), pp. 132, 134, 138, 144, 147, 153, 154, 170, 171, 173-75, 178, and chs 
8-12 and 14-16 passim; William B Willcox, Portrait of a General: Sir Henry Clinton in the War of 
Independence (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1964), pp. 338, 355n, 378, and 382-84. 
3   Sir John Fortescue, A History of the British Army (London: Macmillan & Co, 1902), vol. III; Edward 
McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution (New York: The Macmillan Co, 1901-2); 
Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution (New York: The Macmillan Co, 1952); John R Alden, The 
South in the Revolution 1763-1789 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957); Piers 
Mackesy, The War for America 1775-1783 (reprint of  1964 edition, Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1993); Blackwell P Robinson, William R Davie (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1957); Theodore Thayer, Nathanael Greene: Strategist of the American Revolution (New York: Twayne 
Publishers, 1960); M F Treacy, Prelude to Yorktown: The Southern Campaign of Nathanael Greene, 1780-
1781 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963); Paul David Nelson, General Horatio Gates:  
A Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1976). 
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 The work has two purposes:  first, to provide a comprehensive and fully 
edited transcript of the papers; and second, in view of the numberless inaccuracies 
published about the war, various of which are addressed in the following Parts, to 
provide a commentary, whether in the introductory chapters or various footnotes, 
aimed at presenting the papers in an accurate, balanced and dispassionate way.  
'Yet,' as stated in the preface to volume I, 'it is so very difficult to be accurate, 
balanced and dispassionate about a conflict in which political passions were so 
polarised and views so warped by them.  Inevitably, it is the perspective from which 
the Papers are viewed which will to a degree determine whether the editor is seen to 
have squared the circle.'4 
 
 As far as the comprehensiveness of the transcript is concerned, it is described 
to some degree  in the Editorial method at the beginning of volume I.5  The omission 
of duplicates, triplicates, and quadruplicates of papers appearing in the CP requires 
no further explanation, whereas the omission of odd, extremely isolated papers is 
explained in greater detail in the footnote below.6  Otherwise the papers relating to 
the southern campaigns are published in their entirety. 
                                                 
4
   CP, vol. I, p. ix. 
5   ibid., pp. xiii-xvi. 
6  Such isolated papers are stated to have been omitted on the ground that they do not relate to the 
southern campaigns or are too inconsequential.  If we take volume I as an example, we find that, out 
of the mass of papers that may have appeared there, only fourteen have in fact been omitted on those 
grounds.  Of them, seven do not relate to the war in the south, some being written before 1780, others 
6 
 
 Important as the transcript is, it is not on it that my application for a PhD by 
publication preponderantly rests.  Rather it is on the re-evaluations of certain crucial 
aspects of the war that the introductory chapters and various footnotes contain.  
Necessarily compressed, or else they would unbalance the work, they 'very briefly 
provide pointers,' as the preface explains.  'They also address certain important 
considerations that have long gone by default, together with others that are equally 
pertinent to placing the Papers in context.'7 
 
 Turning now to the historiography of the southern campaigns and to the CP's 
place in it, I shall address, first, the literature predating the publication of my work, 
being literature apparent to me at the time that I was preparing my draft; second, the 
literature postdating its publication; and finally, and most importantly, the ways in 
which the CP has contributed, and is likely to continue to do so, to writing about the 
southern campaigns.  Given that the CP is almost exclusively concerned with the 
                                                                                                                                                        
consisting of intercepted private letters of no relevance, and one a printed resolution of Congress 
relating to the New Hampshire Grants (later to become Vermont).  The rest are also of little 
consequence to the conduct of the southern campaigns or to a reinterpretation of them: an intercepted 
letter requesting payment for two and a half bushels of salt; an intercepted list of Captain Archibald 
Murphey's company of Richmond District, Orange County NC, revolutionary militia; another 
intercepted list of a few NC recruits to the Continental line; a private letter to Cornwallis about the 
appointment of a physician; the draft of a warrant (never effected) to raise a Backcountry Provincial 
regiment; the draft of a letter, dated May 1780, from Cornwallis to Amherst offering his services 
elsewhere in the world, but overtaken by his appointment to command in the south; and lastly a short 
list of supplies appropriated by the army from one particular plantation.  It is on the same grounds 
that extremely isolated papers listed in later volumes are omitted there. 
7 CP, vol. I, p. ix. 
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military aspects of the war, it is works of military history that loom particularly 
large. 
 
 As to military literature predating the publication of the CP, a most 
interesting overview of that by American writers, and almost unique in its day, was 
provided by Higginbotham in 1964, but sadly for my purposes its scope was too 
wide, extending to the war as a whole.  Later it was amplified by him and 
supplemented, among others, by Carp, Coakley and Conn, Coffman, Gephart, 
Greene, Harrow, Karsten, Nelson, and Syrett.8  What follows is a synthesis of their 
views, as partly modified by my own so as to centre more closely on literature about 
military operations in the south. 
 
                                                 
8
   Don Higginbotham, 'American Historians and the Military History of the American Revolution', 
The American Historical Review, 70, No. 1 (October, 1964), pp. 18-34;  Don Higginbotham, 'The Early 
American Way of War:  Reconnaissance and Appraisal', The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., 44, 
No. 2 (April, 1987), pp. 230-73; E Wayne Carp, 'Early American Military History:  A Review of Recent 
Work', The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, 94, No. 3 (July, 1986), pp. 259-84; Robert W 
Coakley and Stetson Conn, 'A Select Bibliography of Historical Literature on the Military History of 
the American Revolution' in their The War of the American Revolution (Washington DC, US 
Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 141-244; Edward M Coffman, 'The New American Military 
History', Military Affairs, 48, No. 1 (January, 1984), pp. 1-5; Ronald M Gephart, Periodical Literature on 
the American Revolution:  Historical Research and Changing Interpretations, 1895-1970 (Washington DC: 
Library of Congress, 1971); Jack P Greene, Interpreting Early America: Historiographical Essays 
(Charlottesville and London, 1996); Stefan M Harrow et al., The American Revolution: A Selected Reading 
List (Washington DC: Library of Congress, 1968); Peter Karsten, 'The "New" American Military 
History: A Map of the Territory, Explored and Unexplored', American Quarterly, 36, No. 3 (1984), pp. 
389-418; Paul David Nelson, 'British Conduct of the American Revolutionary War: A Review of 
Interpretations', The Journal of American History, 65, No. 3 (December, 1978), pp. 623-53; David Syrett, 
'The British Armed Forces in the American Revolutionary War: Publications, 1875-1998', The Journal of 
Military History, 63, No. 1 (January, 1999), pp. 147-64. 
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 There have been three distinct periods into which American historiography of 
the war in the south, and indeed of the war as a whole, may be divided:  the first, 
extending roughly to the end of the nineteenth century, was marked by rampant 
American nationalism, leading the reading public to seek its heroes in the war and 
historians to portray it uncritically in black and white terms;  the second, covering 
the four decades till the close of the Second World War, was a phase in which both 
the public at large and academic historians lost much of their interest in 
revolutionary warfare; and the third, beginning about 1945, has seen the re-entry of 
the military theme into the mainstream of revolutionary studies.  Although, 
beginning in the nineteenth century, much primary material began to be published, 
some in book form, but preponderantly in American historical journals, the fact is 
that American histories, biographies, monographs and articles of that era were so 
materially unbalanced that none is addressed in this essay, being superseded to a 
marked degree by those published since 1945.  As regards the period from the turn 
of the century till then, the publication of primary material continued but otherwise 
writing about the military history of the war in the south was sparse, though 
Gregorie, an academic historian, published a critically acclaimed biography of 
Sumter, and Williams, a gifted non-professional, produced two informative works 
on the overmountain settlers and their involvement in the Battle of King's 
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Mountain.9  American historians were led by the Second World War to begin a vast 
outpouring of material on the military history of the Revolutionary War, a 
phenomenon that shows no signs of abating.  Until then the liberal academic's 
prejudice against war, and by extension those who study it, had prevailed for almost 
half a century, but now it was recognised that the investigation of warfare could not 
be ignored.10  No longer, as distinct from the nineteenth century, were works about 
the Revolutionary War to be characterised by 'drum and bugle' history ― the 
depiction of battles and actions, the relation of heroic conduct, and generally the 
glorification of the martial spirit, but were centred, though by no means solely, on 
campaigns, strategy, tactics, logistics, and weapons.  And with the advent of 
guerrilla wars in Algeria, Angola, Cuba, Indochina, Kenya, Malaya and Vietnam 
there came recognition in the 1970s of the important contribution to the war effort 
made by revolutionary partisans, whether collectively, as in the militia, or as 
individuals.  At the same time a 'new military history' evolved.  As Karsten states, it 
exhibited 'a full-fledged concern with the rest of military history ― that is, a 
fascination with the recruitment, training, and socialization of personnel, combat 
motivation, the effect of service and war on the individual soldier, the veteran, the 
                                                 
9   Anne King Gregorie, Thomas Sumter (Columbia SC: R L Bryan Co, 1931); Samuel Cole Williams, 
Dawn of Tennessee Valley and Tennessee History (Johnson City, Tenn: The Watauga Press, 1937) and 
Tennessee during the Revolutionary War (reprint of 1944 edition, Knoxville: University of Tennessee 
Press, 1974. 
10   For a brief discussion of academic attitudes toward military history, see E Wayne Carp, 'The 
Problem of National Defense in the Early Republic', in Jack P Greene (ed.), The American Revolution: its 
Character and Limits (New York: New York University Press, 1987), pp. 14-50. 
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internal dynamics of military institutions, inter- and intra-service tensions, civil-
military relations, and the relationship between military systems and the greater 
society.'11  All in all, it would be invidious in this introduction to single out specific 
examples of this vast output when so much is relevant to military operations in the 
south.  Rather I shall leave it to the later Parts of this essay to place my original 
contributions to the historiography of the war not only within the context of what 
appears to me the seminal literature since 1945 but also within the wider context of 
earlier work. 
 
 When compared with works by American writers on the southern campaigns 
or by revolutionary participants in them, those emanating from British, loyalist or 
Hessian sources prior to the CP's publication are few indeed.  We have, for example, 
works by Tarleton, MacKenzie, Hanger, Simcoe and Stedman in the eighteenth 
century, by Lamb, Gray, Allaire and Raymond in the nineteenth, and by Fortescue, 
Chesney, Uhlendorf, Robson, Wright, Mackesy, Clinton, Ewald and Davies in the 
twentieth, but overall the material written by British historians is sparse, perhaps 
reflecting a disinclination on their part to write about a war that the British had 
lost.12 
                                                 
11   Karsten, 'The "New" American Military History'. p. 389. 
12
   Banastre Tarleton, A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in the Southern Provinces of North 
America (London, 1787);  Roderick MacKenzie, Strictures on Lt Col Tarleton's History of the Campaigns of 
11 
 
 The CP was published in mid 2010 and continues in print.  Not publicised 
beforehand, or widely afterwards, it took some time for it to become broadly 
disseminated among historians but is now so.  By the close of 2012 works of a 
general nature had begun to make use of it, as had monographs, biographies, and 
articles in historical journals  ― a trend that has continued.13  No serious work about 
                                                                                                                                                        
1780 and 1781 in the Southern Provinces of North America (London, 1787);  The Hon George Hanger, An 
Address to the Army in reply to Strictures of Roderick M'Kenzie (late Lieutenant in the 71st Regiment) on 
Tarleton's History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 (London, 1789);  John Graves Simcoe, A Journal of 
the Operations of the Queen's Rangers from the end of the year 1777 to the conclusion of the late American War 
(Exeter, 1787); Charles Stedman, History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War 
(London, 1792); Roger Lamb, An Original and Authentic Journal of Occurrences During the Late American 
War from its Commencement to the Year 1783 (Dublin, 1809) and Memoir of His Own Life (Dublin, 1811); 
Robert Gray, 'Colonel Robert Gray's Observations on the War in Carolina', North Carolina University 
Magazine, 8, No. 4 (November, 1858), pp. 145-60, republished in The South Carolina Historical and 
Genealogical Magazine, 11 (July, 1910), pp. 139-59; Anthony Allaire, 'Diary', Appendix to Lyman C 
Draper, King's Mountain and its Heroes (Cincinnati, 1881); W O Raymond, 'Roll of Officers of the 
British American or Loyalist Corps', Collections of the New Brunswick Historical Society, 2 (1899); 
Fortescue, History; E A Jones (ed.), 'Journal of Alexander Chesney, A South Carolina Loyalist in the 
Revolution and After', Ohio State University Bulletin, 26, No. 4 (1921); Bernhard A Uhlendorf (trans. 
and ed.), The Siege of Charleston..: Diaries and Letters of Hessian Officers (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1938); Eric Robson, The American Revolution in its Political and Military Aspects 1763-
1783 (reprint of 1955 edition, New York: W W Norton & Co Inc, 1966);  Esmond Wright, Fabric of 
Freedom 1763-1800 (London; Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1965); Mackesy, The War for America; William B 
Willcox (ed.), The American Rebellion: Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative of His Campaigns 1775-1782 (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1954); Joseph P Tustin (trans. and ed.), Diary of the 
American War: A Hessian Journal (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979); K G Davies 
(ed.), Documents of the American Revolution 1770-1783, vols. XVIII and XX (Dublin: Irish Academic 
Press Ltd, 1978-9). 
13   For example Daniel T Canfield, 'The Futility of Force and the Preservation of Power: British 
Strategic Failure in America, 1780-83', Parameters (US Army War College Quarterly), 42, No. 3 
(Autumn, 2012); Carl P Borick, Relieve us of this Burthen:  American Prisoners of War in the Revolutionary 
South, 1780-1782 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2012); William T Graves, Backcountry 
Revolutionary: James Williams 1740-1780 (Lugoff SC: Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution 
Press, 2012); Llewellyn M Toulmin, 'Backcountry Warrior: Brig. Gen. Andrew Williamson', Journal of 
Backcountry Studies, 7, Nos 1 and 2 (Spring and Fall, 2012); Paul E Kopperman, 'The Medical 
Dimension in Cornwallis's Army, 1780-1781', The North Carolina Historical Review, 89, No. 4 (October 
2012); C L Bragg, Crescent Moon over Carolina:  William Moultrie and American Liberty (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 2013); Andrew O'Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America:  British 
Command during the Revolutionary War and the Preservation of the Empire (London: Oneworld 
Publications, 2013); John C Parker Jr, Parker's Guide to the Revolutionary War in South Carolina, 2nd ed. 
12 
 
the war in the south can fail to take into account the CP if it deals with British 
strategy, tactics, the British response from their perspective to the nature of the 
conflict and the problems faced by them, the royal militia, the administration of 
South Carolina outside Charlestown,  the policies pursued and the reasons for them, 
and various other matters on which the contents of the CP throw light.14  
Nevertheless the transcripts, emanating, as they do, almost entirely from British or 
British American officers and officials, inevitably view, through the prism of their 
own polarised perspectives, policies, events, and the actors in them.  While we can, 
for example, accept at face value Cornwallis's contention at Charlotte that the county 
of Mecklenburg was the most rebellious that he had met with in America, we may 
look askance at Turnbull's unbalanced description of inveterate Scotch-Irish 
revolutionaries and the way in which he recommended that they be treated if 
captured:  'Those Mecklenburgh, Roan, and my friends the Irish above are perhaps 
the greatest skum of the Creation.  English lenity is thrown away when there is not 
virtue to meet it half way.  If some of them could be catched who have submitted 
                                                                                                                                                        
(West Conshohocken PA: Infinity Publishing, 2013); Daniel Murphy, William Washington, American 
Light Dragoon: A Continental Cavalry Leader in the War of Independence (Yardley PA: Westholme 
Publishing, 2014); Daniel T Canfield, Understanding British Strategic Failure in America: 1780-1783 
(Charleston SC: Createspace, 2014); Wayne Lynch, 'The Making of a Loyalist', Journal of the American 
Revolution (January 2014); idem., 'Elijah Clarke and the Georgia Refugees fight British Domination' 
(ibid., September 2014); Jim Piecuch, 'Richard Pearis and the Mobilization of South Carolina's 
Backcountry Loyalists' (ibid., October 2014); Wayne Lynch, 'Moses Kirkland and the Southern 
Strategy', Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution (April 2015); William Thomas Sherman, 
Calendar and Record of the Revolutionary War in the South: 1780-1781, 10th ed. (Seattle WA: Gun Jones 
Publishing, 2015); John R Maas, The Road to Yorktown (Charleston SC: The History Press, 2015). 
14   See, for example, Kopperman, 'The Medical Dimension'. 
13 
 
and run off and join'd the rebells, an example on the spot of immediate death and 
confiscation of property might perhaps make them submit.'  So, when we use the 
transcripts to illuminate the past, we need, inevitably, to think about bias in the 
sources, recognising that they are not transparent or innocent documents but are 
written in particular circumstances and for particular audiences.  'Reading against 
the grain' is therefore at times essential, though generally, when we interpret the 
war, we need, as ever, to view it not just through the prism of the present but also 
through that of the past.15 
 
 I now turn to the overall place of the CP in the historiography of the southern 
campaigns.  As previously stated, it comprises both transcripts and a commentary 
on various aspects of the war in the south.  As to the former, it is a continuation not 
only of works by Ross, Stevens, and Davies but, more importantly, of the recently 
published Greene Papers, being those of the Continental general opposed to 
Cornwallis in late 1780 and early 1781.16  As such, the transcripts provide not only 
the views and decisions of Cornwallis and Clinton but also those of the 
Commandant of Charlestown and of subordinate officers in command of posts or 
regiments.  Besides highlighting the problems faced by the British and the measures 
                                                 
15
   CP, vol. I, p. 364, and vol. II, p. 106; John H Arnold, History (Oxford University Press, 2000), passim. 
16   Ross (ed.), Cornwallis Correspondence; Benjamin Franklin Stevens (ed.), The Campaign in Virginia:..: 
the Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, 2 vols. (London, 1887-88); Davies (ed.), Documents; Richard K 
Showman, Dennis M Conrad, Roger N Parks, et al. (eds), The Papers of General Nathanael Greene, vols 
VI to IX (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991-97). 
14 
 
taken to resolve them, they include much other information, for example on logistics 
and the care of the sick or wounded.  All in all, they provide a far more rounded and 
informed picture than one emanating from the British high command alone.  As 
regards the commentary, it is preponderantly concerned with matters other than 
those that the 'new military history' addresses and on which the CP throws only 
marginal light.17  Ipso facto, the commentary adopts a more traditional approach, 
forming conclusions on the nature and events of the war and the actors in it. 
 
 The next Part discusses examples of the original contributions to history 
made, on the one hand, by my commentary in the introductory chapters of the CP 
and, on the other, by my footnotes forming part of it.  I shall seek to place most 
matters there in the context of the historiography relating to them, having described 
in this introduction the overall place of the CP in the historiography of the war.  This 
essay concludes by addressing the big questions and the answers to them given in, 
or inferable from, my commentary.  For example, was the war in the south winnable 
by the British and was the strategy sound?  If not, why not, but if so, what were the 
critical mistakes that led to disaster? 
  
                                                 
17   See, supra, pp. 9-10. 
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PART 2 
Discussion of my commentary 
 
Prefatory remarks 
 
 Wide-ranging and to some degree disparate as they are, my original 
contributions to the history of the southern campaigns are compartmentalised in 
part under the sub-headings set out below.  Necessarily compressed, the 
contributions crystallise my reassessment of the matters or persons addressed. 
 
 As ever, when it comes to the historiography of the war in the south, it is a 
question of separating those works that add to our understanding of it from the 
many that do not.  On Greene alone five works were published between 1960 and 
1972, and since then the rate of publication has increased, particularly in recent 
years.18  Yet apart from Thayer’s and Treacy’s scholarly studies on the one hand, 
Showman’s edition of Greene’s own papers on the other, and the thought-provoking 
work edited by Massey and Piecuch, none adds, at least for the military historian, to 
a better understanding of Greene’s character, strategy and tactics.  Keeping track of 
works on Greene is of course a mere microcosm of the picture as a whole.  As 
                                                 
18   Thayer, Greene; Treacy, Prelude to Yorktown; Clifford L Alderman, Retreat to Victory: The Life of 
Nathanael Greene (Philadelphia: Chilton Book Co, 1967); Ralph Edgar Bailey, Guns over the Carolinas: 
The Story of Nathanael Greene (New York: William Morrow, 1967); Elswyth Thane, The Fighting Quaker: 
Nathanael Greene (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1972); Showman et al. (eds), Greene Papers; Gregory D 
Massey and Jim Piecuch (eds), General Nathanael Greene and the American Revolution in the South 
(Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press, 2012).  The many recent biographies of Greene 
include Lee Patrick Anderson, Forgotten Patriot: The Life and Times of Major-General Nathanael Greene 
(Boca Raton FL: Universal Publishers, 2002); Gerald M Carbone, Nathanael Greene: A Biography of the 
American Revolution (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Terry Golway, Washington’s 
General: Nathanael Greene and the Triumph of the American Revolution (New York: Henry Holt & Co, 
2005); Steven E Siry, Greene: Revolutionary General (Lincoln, Nebr: Potomac Books, 2007); Spencer C 
Tucker, Rise and Fight Again: The Life of Nathanael Greene (Wilmington: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 
2009). 
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Cogliano has stated, 'The present literature on the American Revolution is so vast 
that it would be impossible to digest it in a lifetime...  more works pour off the 
presses monthly.'19  There, historiographically, lies the problem. 
 
 Overall, I remain of opinion that militarily the broad picture of the war has 
not markedly altered since the 1970s, but almost all interpretive works are written 
from an American perspective that does not always coincide with my aim to provide 
an accurate, balanced and dispassionate commentary on the war.  Ipso facto, I have 
preferred to base my own conclusions mostly on primary and secondary material 
rather than on the reworking or interpretation of it in tertiary form, even though in 
many respects there is a wide measure of agreement between the latter and myself.20 
 
 It remains for me here to add a few remarks on the Backcountry of South 
Carolina and Georgia, to which the majority of papers in the CP relate.  On 
extensively reading the literature on the southern campaigns I was struck by the fact 
that nowhere did I find a comprehensive sketch of this vast region or of the life and 
character of its inhabitants.  Scattered items of information were to be found, but 
nowhere were they collated into an overall picture.  Yet in my opinion such a picture 
was essential if one was to place the CP in context and fully understand how 
Backcountry society and the character of its inhabitants impacted on the 
revolutionaries' barbarous conduct of the war.  I have therefore filled the gap.21 
                                                 
19   Francis D Cogliano, Revolutionary America 1763-1815: A political history (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2000), p. 2. 
20   I use "secondary" to describe material emanating from interviews or conversations with persons 
who had taken part in, or lived through, the war.  By "tertiary" I mean material that is neither primary 
nor secondary and, to the extent that it relies on other tertiary material, needs to be treated with a 
measure of caution. 
21   CP, vol. I, pp. 32-5, the sources for which are cited, inter alia, on pp. 41-2.  Among those who first 
alerted me to the nature of the frontier was Mason Locke Weems, but aware that he was a populariser 
who had partly fabricated a biography of Marion, I concluded that I could not rely on him.  I 
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Commentary on events 
 
Clinton's proclamation of 3 June 1780 
 
 This proclamation, which cancelled the paroles of South Carolinians not in the 
military line, has been oft and uniformly interpreted as forcing the disaffected to 
choose between supporting the Crown or taking up arms against it.  Many, so it is 
asserted, were led by the proclamation to take the latter course, thus initiating the 
insurrection.  I, on the other hand, indicate that the damage was in fact done, not by 
the proclamation, but rather by the gloss placed on it by the few militant 
revolutionaries, who interpreted it in a misleading and persuasive way that has 
gained uncritical acceptance down the years.  I conclude by setting out what in my 
estimation were the real factors that led many to take up arms.22 
 
The action at the Waxhaws, 29 May 1780 
 
 No matter Piecuch's contention that no deliberate massacre took place at the 
Waxhaws, the vast disparity in the number of casualties alone suggests that a 
disreputable bloodbath occurred ― a fact that Tarleton himself, in so many words, 
admits, as does Stedman, who was serving with Cornwallis.  Various American 
historians have maintained, ever since the close of the war, that Tarleton was 
responsible for ordering the slaughter, but was he, and did the action instigate, as is 
                                                                                                                                                        
accordingly turned to other sources, for example O'Neall, Chapman and Bridenbaugh, for their 
accounts of drunkenness beyond the fall line, although their wider comments on life there were also 
extremely valuable.  As to drunkenness, see John Belton O'Neall and John Abney Chapman, The 
Annals of Newberry, Historical, Biographical, and Anecdotal (Newberry SC, 1892), pp. 288, 498-9, 512, 526, 
553-4, 558; and Carl Bridenbaugh, Myths & Realities: Societies of the Colonial South (reprint of 1952 
edition, New York: Atheneum, 1976), pp. 142, 177-8. 
22   CP, vol. I, p. 40; Cornwallis's general plan for regulating South Carolina and his dispatch of 30 
June 1780 to Clinton support my own interpretation, ibid., pp. 123-24 and 160-61. 
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generally asserted, the merciless barbarity with which the war was waged by the 
revolutionary irregulars and state troops?23  In answering these questions I have 
relied in part on an eyewitness account by the revolutionary officer who was directly 
involved in the incident that led to the bloodbath.24  It was in fact the dishonouring 
of the flag of truce and the fear that Tarleton had been killed that caused his men to 
run amok.  Tarleton, pinioned beneath his horse, was, as he implies, in no position 
easily to restrain them.  As to the effect of the action on the later behaviour of the 
enemy, I conclude that it served simply as an excuse.  'After a review of the papers in 
volume I and subsequent volumes,' says Borick, 'it is hard to disagree.'25 
 
The royal militia 
 
 The problem of finding suitable field officers and the fragility of the royal 
militia in the summer of 1780 I summarise, basing myself on evidence coming to 
light in the CP.  Whether we begin with Tarleton or continue with works down to 
                                                 
23   Jim Piecuch, The Blood Be Upon Your Head: Tarleton and the Myth of Buford's Massacre (Lugoff SC: 
Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution Press, 2010), pp. 27-40; Tarleton, Campaigns, p. 31; 
Stedman, History, ii, pp. 193, 325.  For American accounts down the years of Tarleton's involvement 
see, for example, David Ramsay, The History of the Revolution of South-Carolina from a British Province to 
an Independent State, 2 vols. (Trenton, 1785), ii, pp. 109-10; William Dobein James, A Sketch of the Life of 
Brig. Gen. Francis Marion and A History of His Brigade (Charleston, 1821), Appendix, pp. 1-7; Joseph 
Johnson, Traditions and Reminiscences chiefly of the American Revolution in the South (Charleston, 1851), 
p. 311; McCrady, History, i, pp. 519, 522; Bass, Green Dragoon, pp. 80-3; Russell F Weigley, The Partisan 
War: The South Carolina Campaign of 1780-1782 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1970), p. 
7; Charles Bracelen Flood, Rise and Fight Again: Perilous Times along the Road to Independence (New 
York: Dodd, Mead and Co, 1976), pp. 259-61; Henry Lumkin, From Savannah to Yorktown: The American 
Revolution in the South (St Paul, Minn: Paragon House, 1981), p. 50; J Tracy Power, '"The Virtue of 
Humanity Was Totally Forgot": Buford's Massacre, May 29, 1780', South Carolina Historical Magazine, 
93, No. 1 (January 1992), pp. 5-14; John Buchanan, The Road to Guilford Courthouse:  The American 
Revolution in the Carolinas (Hoboken NJ: John Wiley and Sons Inc, 1997), pp. 84-5; David K Wilson, The 
Southern Strategy: Britain's Conquest of South Carolina and Georgia, 1775-1780 (reprint of 2005 edition, 
Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2008), p. 259. 
24
   CP, vol. I, p. 35; Alexander Garden, Anecdotes of the American Revolution (Second Series) (Charleston, 
1828), pp. 126-28. 
25
    Carl P Borick, Review, The South Carolina Historical Magazine, 112, Nos 1-2 (January-April 2011), p. 
89. 
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the present day, we find that, while various authors relate the defection of Mills' and 
Floyd's regiments, none provides as complete a picture of the royal militia at this 
time as I do.26 
 
What if the Battle of Camden had been lost? 
 
 Cornwallis's victory was so comprehensive that historians have been 
seemingly distracted into believing that it was inevitable.  None ― at least of those 
that I have read ―  has questioned Cornwallis's assertion that there was 'little to lose 
by a defeat'.  I on the contrary maintain that there was everything to lose ― the war, 
in fact, itself.27  No victory is inevitable.  However propitious the prospects of 
success, chance inevitably plays its part in battles and can be the determining factor. 
 
The autumn campaign 
 
 Cornwallis's dispatches at this time to Germain and Clinton have for the most 
part been long in the public domain and have been relied on by historians to provide 
a broad outline of his advance to Charlotte.  I supplement those accounts with more 
detailed information about the problems facing him before his march, the sickliness 
of his troops, and the coming up of his reinforcements.  As regards his plan of 
campaign, I quote an unpublished letter that he wrote to Wemyss and go on to 
describe how, overstretched as he was, disaster struck at Charlotte.  Basing myself 
here and elsewhere on the CP, I then provide a critique of the risks he was running 
in embarking on the campaign and continue by questioning why the campaign ever 
took place.  I conclude by suggesting that he struck the wrong balance between 
                                                 
26   CP, vol. I, pp. 40, 151; Tarleton, Campaigns, pp. 93, 98. 
27
   CP, vol. II, pp. 4, 12. 
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political and military considerations and acted prematurely.  In a nutshell, and not 
for the only time, his strategic judgement was in my opinion at fault.28  Wherever the 
historiography of the southern campaigns leads us, whether to early, later or recent 
works by British or American writers, we find neither the breadth of information 
about the campaign that I provide nor anything approaching my comprehensive 
analysis of the attendant risks and of the underlying strategy.29 
 
Wemyss' and Moncrief's expeditions to the east of the Wateree and Santee 
 
 Relying on the CP, I relate for the first time the composition of Wemyss' 
detachment and contradict accounts percolating down to the present day that he 
conducted a wholesale hanging spree.  Actually only one man was executed.  What 
in reality has come down to us is a distortion of the facts, a distortion arising in the 
same way as with Dunlap, a British American officer in Ferguson's corps.30  History 
has remained virtually silent about Moncrief's foray.  Swisher summarises it very 
inaccurately in one brief sentence, but elsewhere we search almost in vain for 
references to it. 31 
  
                                                 
28   Ibid., pp. 25-6, 28-30, 32. 
29   See, for example, Tarleton, Campaigns, pp. 158-61, 166; Stedman, History, ii, pp. 215-18; Fortescue, 
History, pp. 321-22, 324; McCrady, History, i, pp. 741, 806-08; Robson, American Revolution, pp. 136-37; 
Howard H Peckham, The War for Independence: A Military History (reprint of 1958 edition, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1973), pp. 147, 149; Mackesy, The War for America, pp. 344-45; Hugh F 
Rankin (ed.), The American Revolution (London: Secker & Warburg, 1964), pp. 256-57; Don 
Higginbotham, The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763-1789 
(New York: The Macmillan Co, 1971), p. 363; Ira D Gruber, 'Britain’s Southern Strategy', in W Robert 
Higgins (ed.), The Revolutionary War in the South: Power, Conflict, and Leadership (Durham NC: Duke 
University Press, 1979), pp. 229-30; Pancake, This Destructive War, pp. 112, 117-18, 120-21; Dan L 
Morrill, Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution (Mount Pleasant SC: The Nautical & Aviation 
Pub Co of America, 1993), pp. 97-8; Buchanan, Road to Guilford, pp. 186-88. 
30   See, for example, Buchanan, supra, p. 185.  CP, vol. II, p. 26; as to Dunlap, see, infra, p. 35-6. 
31   CP, ibid; James K Swisher, The Revolutionary War in the Southern Back Country (Gretna LA: Pelican 
Publishing Co, 2012), p. 200. 
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 I extensively explain, in a way that has never surfaced before, why the two 
forays were justified.  In doing so I quote Cornwallis on the threat to the 
communication between the upper army and Charlestown posed by the virulently 
disaffected country east of the Wateree and Santee.  I then conclude, like Cornwallis, 
that lenity and conciliation stood no chance in resolving the problem, the only option 
being the policy of deterrence adopted by him.32 
 
Cornwallis's refitment at Winnsborough and the start of the winter campaign 
 
 An essay of this prescribed length entails my being necessarily brief and 
necessarily selective of my original contributions to history.  So, suffice it for me to 
notice here my sequential description of the defensive state of South Carolina and 
Georgia at this time ― a much more extensive and rounded description than is 
found elsewhere, together with one example below of minor but revealing ways in 
which I have also contributed.33 
 
 Works about the war are littered with references to troop numbers, whether 
to rank and file or not, and betray some confusion between the two.  On analysing 
British and British American regimental returns I discovered that the proportion of 
officers, serjeants and drummers was consistently 17.5% of all ranks.  I apply this 
factor to calculating Tarleton's total force at the Battle of Cowpens and Cornwallis's 
remaining force for the winter campaign, which had previously been uncertain.34  
                                                 
32   CP, vol. II, p. 27. 
33   CP, vol. III, pp. 4-9. 
34   If, for example, we take Tarleton's total force at Cowpens, I accurately calculate it as 1,150 men.  
Whereas the likes of Higginbotham, Waring and Ward agree with me, others such as Hunter, Schenck 
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Yorktown, p. 111; Bass, Green Dragoon, pp. 143, 147, 159; Fortescue, History, p. 359; the Wickwires, 
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That the factor is accurate is borne out by the correlation of the two returns, one for 
rank and file, and the other for all ranks, that capitulated at Yorktown.35 
 
The rest of the winter campaign 
 
 Partly for the reason I have given, and partly to make way for wider 
comments on other matters, I perforce restrict myself to simply noticing my 
contributions to the history of the campaign, being contributions not precedented 
elsewhere, namely my evaluation of the wider motives propelling Cornwallis to 
continue with the campaign after Cowpens; my evaluation of the strategy that he 
would most probably have pursued if the defeat at Cowpens had not occurred; and 
my correlation, using the factor of 17.5%, of the conflicting returns of the troops that 
he brought to the battle at Guilford.36 
 
A central enigma of the southern campaigns resolved 
 
 Prior to the publication of the CP Cornwallis's decision to forsake South 
Carolina and Georgia and march from Wilmington into Virginia had puzzled 
historians for almost 230 years.  None had come close to determining his real 
motives.  Almost all, like Alden, Gruber, Lumkin, Mackesy, Peckham and Tonsetic, 
had simply accepted the decision at face value or as no more than a strategic 
                                                                                                                                                        
Cornwallis, p. 256; Alice N Waring, The Fighting Elder: Andrew Pickens (1739-1817) (Columbia: University 
of South Carolina Press, 1962), p. 47; Henry B Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution, 1775-1781, 
(5th edition, New York, 1888), p. 542; Don Higginbotham, Daniel Morgan: Revolutionary Rifleman 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), p. 130; Cyrus Lee Hunter, Sketches of Western 
North Carolina... illustrating principally the Revolutionary Period (Raleigh NC, 1877), p. 333; David 
Schenck, North Carolina 1780-81 (Raleigh NC, 1889), p. 219; James Graham, The Life of General Daniel 
Morgan (New York, 1856), pp. 277-78). 
35   CP, vol. III, pp. 11-2, and vol. VI, p. 6. 
36   CP, vol. IV, pp. 3, 5, 8. 
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mistake, while a few, like Pancake and Rankin, had attempted to justify it on 
spurious grounds such as assuring the safety of the Carolinas by disrupting Greene’s 
supplies and reinforcements or as making the Chesapeake the main focus of the 
war.37 
 
 In what Borick has described as among my 'most groundbreaking and 
insightful analysis' I have sought to disprove, by drawing on the CP alone, 
Cornwallis’s contention that it was impracticable for him to return overland to South 
Carolina.  I have gone on to analyse his stated reasons for not moving that way and 
concluded that they do not makes sense.  This being so, I have advanced what in my 
estimation were most likely the real reasons propelling him to take the absurd and 
fateful decision that he did, besides explaining why the whole affair evinced 'at best 
a serious flaw in his character and at worst a gross dereliction of duty'.  In short, 
Cornwallis was temperamentally ill at ease with defensive warfare, a prospect facing 
him if he returned to South Carolina and Georgia; being a humane, cultivated man, 
he was sickened by the murderous barbarity with which the war was waged there 
by the revolutionary irregulars and state troops; he had no stomach for the 
necessarily disagreeable measures involved in suppressing the rebellion there; he 
was suffering from the mental and physical fatigue of commanding a year's hard 
and solid campaigning; and always keen to act offensively, he simply opted for the 
more congenial alternative of doing so in Virginia, well away from the distasteful 
nature of the war farther south ― an alternative, incidentally, which pricked his 
                                                 
37   John R Alden, The American Revolution 1775-1783 (reprint of 1954 edition, New York: Harper & 
Row, 1962), p. 238; idem, A History of the American Revolution (London: Macdonald and Co, 1969), p. 
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pride less than the perceived ignominy of conducting a defensive war to the 
southward after another unsuccessful campaign.   To Tarleton too I apportion part of 
the blame for Cornwallis's decision to march north.38 
 
Yorktown 
 
 If we begin with Hanger, who took part in Clinton's failed attempt to relieve 
Cornwallis, and then turn to historians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
whose interpretations have carried great weight, we find a uniformity of view that 
the single or prime cause of the capitulation was the Royal Navy's losing command 
of North American waters. 
 
 Discounting the defeats at King's Mountain and Cowpens as 'only partial 
misfortunes', Hanger continues, 'I will be so bold as to assert that these misfortunes 
did not in any degree contribute to the loss of America, nor could many such 
misfortunes have produced that calamity.  Our ruin was completed by permitting a 
superior French fleet to ride triumphant on the American seas the autumn of 1781.  
That, and that only, ruined our cause in America and disgracefully put an end to the 
war.  There the nail was clinched!'39  Among those agreeing with Hanger are 
Johnston, Carrington, and more recently Mackesy, Wallace and Ward.  Others such 
as Adams and Robson concede that lost superiority at sea was the prime cause of the 
disaster but do not elaborate as to the rest.  Willcox and Higginbotham are among 
                                                 
38  Borick, Review, p. 89; CP, vol. IV, pp. 101-03. 
39   Hanger, An Address, pp. 127-28. 
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those who mention that British military strategy was also at fault, but again without 
elaboration.40 
 
 While accepting that French naval superiority was the immediate cause of the 
defeat, I myself aver ― unlike the historians I cite ― that it was due preponderantly 
to a series of chance circumstances, a number of which, if they had been otherwise, 
would not have placed Cornwallis at Yorktown or would have averted his 
capitulation in other ways.41  As to the dilatoriness of the Royal Navy in repairing its 
fleet, I state, 'There is reason to suspect that the repairs to the ships damaged in the 
Battle of the Chesapeake Capes may not have been progressed as rapidly and as 
urgently as the critical situation demanded.  Had they been completed a week 
sooner, Cornwallis might well have been saved.'42  In coming to these conclusions I 
had in mind comments made in his diary by Mackenzie, one of Clinton's aides-de-
camp.  On 1 October he remarks, 'It appears very doubtful that the Navy will after 
all attempt or undertake any thing towards the relief of Lord Cornwallis.'  The 
captains 'appear more ready to censure the conduct of others than to refit their own 
ships.  Several of the captains spend more of their time on shore than they do on 
board and appear as unconcerned about the matter as if they commanded guard 
ships at Portsmouth.'  On 16 October he continues, 'If the Navy are not a little more 
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active, they will not get a sight of the Capes of Virginia before the end of this month 
and then it will be too late.  They do not seem to be hearty in the business or to think 
that the saving that army is an object of such material consequence.'43 
 
 Cornwallis has at times been criticised for abandoning his outer line of 
defence, for not breaking out immediately on the arrival of the French fleet, or for 
leaving too late his attempt to do so.44  I refute such charges and explain why in my 
opinion his conduct was unexceptionable ― in fact perfectly understandable in the 
circumstances.45 
 
 It remains for me here to add briefly to my comments about Washington.  
'Like all great commanders,' says Robson, 'he was aided by sheer good fortune.'  I go 
one step further and suggest that, for the reasons I advance, he was a general who 
was not just lucky in the Yorktown campaign but extraordinarily so. 46 
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Re-evaluations of certain British or British American actors47 
 
Sir Henry Clinton 
 
 Much has been written about Clinton's character, whether, for example, by 
Willcox, Willcox and Wyatt, or more recently O'Shaughnessy, but none in so many 
words draws the fundamental conclusion that I do.48  For instance Willcox and 
Wyatt, who in their psychological exploration of Clinton's character dwell equally on 
the problems of a diagnostic approach based on limited historical evidence, conclude 
that the paradoxes of his conduct can largely be explained by the assumption that he 
suffered from a conflict, unresolved since childhood, between craving and dreading 
to exercise authority.  'The central point is that Clinton, although greedy for 
authority, was afraid of exercising it because it represented an area, the paternal, 
where a part of himself insisted he did not belong...  This conflict affected both 
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phases of his American career.  When he was intent on telling his superiors what to 
do, he obviously craved power...  As commander in chief, responsible only to the 
distant ministers of the Crown, he was hesitant and unhappy about using his power; 
his attitude suggests an unconscious conviction that he ought not to have it.'49 
 
 I on the other hand come to what appears to me a simpler, more 
commonplace conclusion that Clinton exhibited the classic signs of someone 
suffering from a marked sense of inadequacy, a conclusion that implicitly reflects on 
his entire conduct during the war.50  No such link is explicitly drawn in any of 
Willcox's cited works.  As to the principal signs exhibited by Clinton, he, as a 
subordinate, was overassertive, overcritical, and overly resentful when his advice 
was rejected; he, as Commander-in-Chief, was prickly, belittling of his colleagues, 
and quick to assume they were incompetent; he stored up perceived grievances 
aplenty; and typically, when associated with his other traits, he was shy, diffident, 
and did not mingle easily. 
 
Banastre Tarleton 
 
 The bête noir of the southern campaigns, Tarleton has received an almost 
uniformly bad press, being castigated for severity in a tide of vilification that began 
during the Revolution and, with a few notable exceptions mentioned below, 
continues to the present day.  Yet underlying his actions, as I seek to maintain, was 'a 
defensible approach to the war which has received scant attention, particularly from 
American writers, who have superficially and uncritically followed revolutionary 
propaganda in demonising the man.'  In a nutshell, and for the reasons I set out in 
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the CP, he like the revolutionaries had, in a politically polarised situation, 'an 
intuitive conviction that a winning policy had no option but to rely primarily on 
deterrence.  Indeed, as he saw it, the greater the deterrence, the sooner the 
restoration of peace and good government under the Crown.'51 
 
 My reappraisal of Tarleton is in part a contribution to an ongoing academic 
debate about him that began with the publication of two works by Scotti and 
Piecuch in 2007 and 2010.  Scotti maintains that 'there is no real quantitative or 
qualitative evidence that suggests his men committed more depredations than 
anyone else in the Revolutionary War.'  He later goes on, 'In the process [of 
mythologising the man, as continued by modern historians,] Americans have divorced 
themselves from the reality, which is that Banastre Tarleton is no more guilty or 
innocent of wanton devastation than anyone else who participated in that struggle.'  
As regards Piecuch, he questions whether Tarleton and his men were ever guilty of a 
deliberate massacre at the Waxhaws, a matter which I have already addressed.52 
 
 Among those eminent British historians who have written about the 
Revolution since World War II, Mackesy, Robson and Wright have made no 
criticism of Tarleton.  Indeed Wright remarks, 'Of the British tactical commanders, 
there were two... who were both clever and positive, now deeply buried though they 
are in the seventh circle of execration in America:  Arnold and Tarleton.'  He later 
continues, 'Whatever his relationship with Mary (Perdita) Robinson, who helped 
him write his book on the war as well as his parliamentary speeches, and whom, 
true to his lights, he deserted, Tarleton showed an energy and capacity all too rare 
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Heritage Books, 2007), pp. 135 and 137; Piecuch, Tarleton and the Myth, pp. 27-40; see, supra, pp. 17-8. 
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among the British commanders.  To Rochambeau, however, as to all Americans, he 
was "a butcher and a barbarian".'53 
 
Nisbet Balfour 
 
 Balfour, the Commandant of Charlestown, fared for many years little better 
than Tarleton in the eyes of American historians. 
 
 Ramsay, a member of the South Carolina revolutionary legislature, set the 
tone for American writing about the military history of the war for well over a 
century.  Despite stating that he had endeavoured 'to write impartially for the good 
of mankind', he has provided a rather unbalanced version of events not entirely free 
from partisan vituperation, as may be seen from his unflattering opinion of Balfour, 
which I quote.  Others, for example Lee, Lossing and McCrady, have followed suit 
with equally damning remarks.  I also quote Moultrie, the Continental general in 
charge of the revolutionary prisoners at Charlestown.54 
 
 'Fortunately for Balfour,' so I say, 'the passage of time has led to a less emotive 
and more balanced assessment of his conduct.'  For example, McCowen asserts that 
'little can be found to substantiate the accusations of Moultrie and Ramsay', to which 
I refer.  He continues, 'As British commandant, Balfour was understandably 
unyielding toward the revolutionaries.  He scrupulously carried out the commands 
of his superiors in regard to policies in Charleston and wisely deferred to the Board 
                                                 
53   Wright, Fabric of Freedom, p. 117. 
54   Ramsay, The Revolution of South-Carolina, ii, pp. 263-64; Henry Lee, Memoirs of the War in the 
Southern Department of the United States (revised edition, New York, 1869), p. 462; Benson J Lossing, 
The Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution, 2 vols (New York, 1855), ii, p. 568n; McCrady, History,  i, p. 
715; William Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution (New York, 1802), p. 300. 
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of Police in civil matters.  Thus there would seem to be little reason to regard Balfour 
as the villain of the British occupation of Charleston.  Perhaps Moultrie and Ramsay 
were too personally involved in the events of the time to evaluate objectively the 
effectiveness of the British officer whose personality they found overbearing.'55 
 
 By contrast my own assessment provides a more rounded portrayal of 
Balfour and the exercise of his functions than is found elsewhere.  I begin by making 
the perhaps self-evident but often unacknowledged point that he was faced with the 
realities of power, by which I mean first and foremost that he was no free agent but a 
servant of the Crown whose duty was to suppress the rebellion.  I draw the 
inescapable conclusions.  I then explain why he may have been rather short with 
incorrigible revolutionaries before noting his immense contribution to the war effort 
in the Carolinas and his qualities as an officer.  All in all, Balfour comes out of my 
pen portrait rather well.56  
 
John Watson Tadwell Watson 
 
 Watson was the lt colonel commanding a corps of British American light 
infantry that arrived at Charlestown in mid December 1780.  Much has been written, 
whether by revolutionary participants or later, about his brief service in South 
Carolina, particularly his fraught expedition to the east and his encounters with 
Marion, but how he came to be serving there instead of taking part in the winter 
                                                 
55   George Smith McCowen Jr, The British Occupation of Charleston, 1780-82 (Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1972), pp. 144-45. 
56   CP, vol. I, pp. 35-7. 
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campaign, what was his character as a Guards officer, and why he failed to reinforce 
Rawdon before the Battle of Hobkirk's Hill have remained a mystery.57 
 
 Drawing on the CP, I have provided answers ― or partial ones ― to those 
questions.58  As to his character,  I conclude that he was typical of many a Guards 
officer down the years, seemingly puffed up with self-importance and reluctant to 
obey or co-operate with ranking officers such as Rawdon, Balfour and Tarleton 
whom he considered his professional inferiors.  It was for this reason that Cornwallis 
decided not to take him and his men on the winter campaign because there would 
have been a constant difficulty of command between him and Tarleton.  As regards 
his failure to reinforce Rawdon, he may have disobeyed orders, they may have 
miscarried, or he may have been unavoidably delayed by Balfour's stopping him to 
cover the ferries for Cornwallis's possible return from Wilmington. 
 
Alexander Stewart and Paston Gould 
 
 Stewart, Lt Colonel of the 3rd Regiment (the Buffs), assumed command of the 
troops on the frontier of South Carolina on 16 July 1781 and went on to lead them 
bravely in the Battle of Eutaw Springs on 8 September.  The basics of his service in 
                                                 
57   See, for example, James, Marion, passim; William Johnson, Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of 
Nathanael Greene, Major General of the Armies of the United States, (Charleston, 1822), ii, pp. 68, 71-2, 104-
05; Robert W Gibbes (ed.), Documentary History of the American Revolution consisting of Letters and 
Papers relating to the Contest for Liberty, chiefly in South Carolina, (Columbia SC, 1853), iii, passim; 
Lossing, Field-Book, ii, pp. 472-75, 479, 500-01, 565-66; David Duncan Wallace, South Carolina: A Short 
History, 1520-1948 (reprint of 1951 edition, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1969), p. 
315; Mark Mayo Boatner III, Encyclopedia of the American Revolution (New York: David McKay Co, 
1973), p. 1172; Robert D Bass, Swamp Fox: The Life and Campaigns of General Francis Marion (reprint of 
1959 edition, Columbia: The Sandlapper Press Inc, 1976), passim; Rankin, Marion, passim; Showman et 
al. (eds), Greene Papers, passim; Buchanan, Road to Guilford, pp. 395-96; John W Gordon, South Carolina 
and the American Revolution: A Battlefield History (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 
p. 142. 
58   CP, vol. II, pp. 199-200, note 39. 
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the south have long been known, but until the CP was published, history remained 
silent about his character.  I have filled the gap with an unflattering portrait of him 
based on the CP.  I have also drawn on the light thrown by the CP on his 
disreputable failure to co-operate in the relief of Ninety Six.59 
 
 The character of Gould also remained unknown.  The titular successor to 
Rawdon, he was, as I conclude from the CP, a weak man, a previously unrevealed 
consideration that led Cornwallis to supersede him with Leslie.  Blame for not co-
operating in the relief of Ninety Six must also be laid at his door.60  
 
Patrick Ferguson 
 
 A consensus has yet to arise as to Ferguson's character and the exercise of his 
functions as Inspector of Militia, though the CP goes a long way to supporting my 
own overall conclusion.  Yet, as I relate, unsubstantiated criticism continues to arise 
― and from surprising quarters.  For example Higginbotham, who with Shy has 
perhaps done most to contribute in recent times to a reassessment of the nature of 
the war, begins by stating more or less accurately that 'the king's friends in the south 
favored anything but pacification as that word is currently used.  Instead they 
wanted a course of harsh retribution.'  So far so good, but he then mistakenly 
contends, at least as far as Ferguson is concerned, that 'their views were shared by 
some of Clinton's subordinates, especially those most exposed to tory opinions such 
as Banastre Tarleton, Patrick Ferguson, and Lord Rawdon.'61 
                                                 
59   CP, vol. V, p. 295, note 30. 
60   Ibid, p. 294, note 29. 
61   CP, vol. I, p. 38; Don Higginbotham, 'Reflections on the War of Independence, Modern Guerrilla 
Warfare, and the War in Vietnam', in Ronald Hoffman and Peter J Albert (eds.), Arms and 
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 It is true that Ferguson had vacillated between favouring a scorched-earth 
and a conciliatory approach to the war, but by 1780 he had come down firmly in 
support of the latter.  Nevertheless, Shy maintains that he remained among the 
group of 'hotheaded young officers... that advocated the use of fire and sword to 
defeat the American rebellion.'62 
 
 Nothing has puzzled historians so much as the circumstances that led 
Ferguson to occupy King's Mountain instead of pressing ahead to join Cornwallis.  
'Why,' asks Lumkin, 'did Patrick Ferguson, a good and experienced soldier, choose a 
position impossible to defend against rifle-armed opponents using frontier forest 
tactics?  No one knows.'  I suggest an answer based at first on Ferguson's reluctance 
to forego a separate command and his belief that he could defeat his opponents 
himself, and ultimately, as he realised his hopes of success were doubtful, on his 
mistaken choice of a defensive position from which he seemingly could not be forced 
but which proved ideally suited for an onslaught by revolutionary irregulars.63  
 
Thomas Fraser 
 
 Fraser played an active part in the operations in South Carolina but his 
background was uncharted.  Not until the publication of the CP and my portrayal of 
him was it established that he was a Scot who had been a lieutenant in the New York 
                                                                                                                                                        
Independence: The Military Character of the American Revolution (Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 1984), p. 20. 
62   Ferguson to Clinton, 10 and 15 October 1778, PRO 5/96(177) and (179) (UK National Archives, 
Kew); Stephen Conway, 'To Subdue America: British Army Officers and the Conduct of the 
Revolutionary War', William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 43, No. 3 (July 1986), p. 383; John Shy, 
'British Strategy for Pacifying the Southern Colonies, 1778-1781', in Jeffrey J Crow and Larry E Tise 
(eds), The Southern Experience in the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1978), p. 167. 
63   Lumkin, Savannah to Yorktown, p. 93; CP, vol. II, pp. 30-1. 
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Volunteers and had been born in 1755.  Nor until then was his service in South 
Carolina known before his appointment to command the South Carolina Royalist 
Regiment.64 
 
George Hanger 
 
 Hanger played a short but important part in the southern campaigns, being 
major and second in command of Tarleton's British Legion during the summer and 
autumn of 1780.  As such he made a significant contribution to the victory at 
Camden and commanded the British van on the entry into Charlotte.  It is, however, 
as author of An Address to the Army, one of the relatively few commentaries on the 
southern campaigns by a British participant, that he is best remembered as far as the 
war is concerned, a contribution that has led in part to my deciding to provide a pen 
portrait of him.  It corrects manifold inaccuracies littering the historical record, for 
example as to his character and the nature and length of his service in America.65 
 
James Dunlap 
 
 By no means rosy is the picture of Dunlap emanating from revolutionary 
sources and followed by American historians to this day, but whether it is accurate is 
a moot point.  For the reasons advanced in my pen portrait of him I suspect not .66  A 
captain in the Queen's Rangers on secondment to Ferguson's corps, Dunlap was, as I 
say, vilified by the revolutionaries for brutality and plundering, but scarce one 
                                                 
64   CP, vol. I, p. 243, note 11. 
65  Ibid., pp. 38-9.  Having half completed a biography of Hanger, which has been placed on the 
backburner during the writing of this essay, I dare say there are few, if any, who know more about 
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66   CP, vol I, 74-5, note 5. 
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concrete example has come to light, which alone is suspicious.67  Examples of recent 
American historians who have relied on those revolutionary sources are Waring and 
Bass.  Paraphrasing them, but like them in only general terms, Bass remarks, 'James 
Dunlap had been vicious and wanton.  His plundering, depredations and murders 
had aroused uncontrollable hatred.68 
 
 I have previously observed that there are, despite the passage of years, 
distinct parallels ― yet to be drawn by historians ― between the troubles in 
Northern Ireland and the Revolutionary War in America, not least in the attitudes of 
the opposing sides.69  Yes, there were occasional lapses by the security forces in the 
province, but a disinterested observer may conclude that the opposing party 
unremittingly depicted the security forces' actions in the worst possible light.  So, for 
the reasons I advance, was it the case with Dunlap. 
 
Re-evaluations of certain revolutionary actors 
 
Thomas Sumter 
 
 While adverting to the internecine warfare waged in the Backcountry of South 
Carolina, the two standard biographies of Sumter, the brigadier general 
commanding the revolutionary militia there, gloss over his responsibility for the 
often barbarous conduct of his men.  I do not, although I accept that he was fighting 
a partisan war.  Overall, I assert that he consistently displayed a marked streak of 
                                                 
67   See, for example, Hugh McCall, The History of Georgia, vol II (Savannah, 1816), p. 352; Johnson, Life 
and Correspondence of Greene, ii, p. 107; Draper, King's Mountain, pp. 159, 164. 
68
  Waring, Fighting Elder, pp. 41, 68; Robert D Bass, Ninety Six: The Struggle for the South Carolina Back 
Country (Columbia: The Sandlapper Press Inc, 1978), p. 349. 
69   See CP, vol. I, back cover. 
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ruthlessness which did not scruple to employ measures such as cold-blooded 
murder on a grand scale.  Leading me to this necessarily compressed conclusion is a 
variety of primary sources.70 
 
 For example, when Sumter captured Orangeburg on 11 May 1781, thirteen of 
the loyalist prisoners were shot in cold blood.  On 23 November 1780 Cornwallis, 
who had no reason to lie to a subordinate, advised Cruger that Sumter's men 'have 
been guilty of the most horrid outrages'.  Not only was Sumter responsible but also 
Brandon, Clark and others, who, as Cornwallis explained on 3 December 1780 to 
Clinton, 'had different corps plundering the houses and putting to death the well 
affected inhabitants between Tyger River and Pacolet.'  Next day he observed to 
Clinton, 'I will not hurt your Excellency's feelings by attempting to describe the 
shocking tortures and inhuman murders which are every day committed by the 
enemy, not only on those who have taken part with us, but on many who refuse to 
join them…  I am very sure that unless some steps are taken [by the enemy] to check 
it, the war in this quarter will become truly savage.'  On 7 March 1781, when 
Rawdon reported to Cornwallis on Sumter's foray down the Congaree and Santee, 
he remarked generally on 'the savage cruelty of the enemy, who commit the most 
wanton murders in cold blood upon the friends of Government that fall into their 
hands'.  Turning specifically to Sumter, he related that, while blockading Fort 
Granby, Sumter 'summoned by proclamation all the inhabitants to join him, offering 
to all such as would take part with him a full pardon for their former attachment to 
us and denouncing penalty of death to all who did not range themselves under his 
standard by the 23rd of February.  To give weight to these threats several persons 
known to be friendly towards us were inhumanly murdered, tho' unarmed and 
                                                 
70  Gregorie, Sumter, passim; Robert D Bass, Gamecock: The Life and Times of General Thomas Sumter (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), passim; CP, vol. I, p. 150. 
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remaining peaceably at their own houses.'71  From the examples I have cited it is in 
my opinion fallacious to believe that Sumter did not condone or approve of the 
barbarous conduct of his men.  
 
 Cornwallis well understood the nature of the creature opposed to him.  When 
Wemyss and his wounded men were captured at Fishdam Ford, Cornwallis 
immediately assumed that they had been ill treated by Sumter.  He was of course 
mistaken, for Sumter never mistreated captured British or British American troops, 
but his reaction speaks volumes.  Nor could he bring himself to write personally to 
Sumter about the exchange of John Hutchison, a loyalist prisoner whom it was 
suspected Sumter was about to hang.  Although Cornwallis drafted the letter 
himself, it was signed by John Money, his aide-de-camp.  By contrast he had no 
compunction about writing to Gates, Greene and Smallwood, who were other 
revolutionary generals in the south.72 
 
Andrew Williamson 
 
 Williamson was the brigadier general commanding the revolutionary militia 
in the Backcountry of South Carolina till shortly after the fall of Charlestown.  He 
then capitulated and ever since his status and role have remained in obscurity.  
'There hangs a heavy cloud over Williamson's conduct at this time,' remarks 
McCrady, but until my pen portrait of him no one had convincingly succeeded in 
explaining it.73  Since then an unrevealing article about him has been penned by 
Toulmin, but prior to the publication of the CP the only biographical information 
                                                 
71   'Levi Smith's Narrative', The Royal Gazette (Charlestown), 13-17 April 1782, reprinted in the Political 
Magazine (London), June 1782, p. 378; CP, vol. III, pp. 25, 28, 273, and vol. IV, p. 47. 
72   CP, vol. III, pp. 68, 74, and vol. II, pp. 330-31, 341-42. 
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about him was that briefly set out in three biographical dictionaries.  None 
approaches a satisfactory explanation of his behaviour.74  Otherwise we are left with 
brief, scattered and unexplained references to his taking protection, which he did 
not, or ― far fewer ― to his entering into a parole, which he did.  Protection, of 
course, involved swearing allegiance to the Crown.75  I, on the other hand, basing my 
conclusions on the CP, accurately describe his status, together with his duplicitous 
behaviour and the likely motives for it.  I also report a further instance of his 
duplicity: his acting as a spy for Greene.76 
 
Andrew Pickens 
 
 Colonel of the Long Cane revolutionary militia, Pickens was granted a parole 
after the fall of Charlestown and remained peaceably at home till the close of 1780.  
He then proceeded to break his parole, went off with a band of his men to take part 
in the Battle of Cowpens, and for his part in the victory was promoted to brigadier 
general of militia by the ousted revolutionary governor, John Rutledge. 
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 Relying on McCall, as does Waring, American writers have consistently 
maintained that Pickens was a man of honour who quite reasonably considered 
himself released from his parole as a result of being plundered by James Dunlap, a 
British American officer (see, supra, page 35-6).  It is not a version of events 
supported by the CP.  Based on evidence there, I conclude that it was most likely a 
fabrication and leave the reader to form his or her own view of Pickens' breaking his 
word, though in such a way as to imply my own assessment of his conduct.77 
 
 Waring's remains the most authoritative biography of Pickens, who had been 
the subject of three others prior to the publication of the CP.  Since then one by 
Reynolds, a direct descendent of Pickens' brother Joseph, has appeared.  An 
academically flawed work, it materially lacks balance and is not averse to a cavalier 
treatment of primary sources, ascribing, for example ― without corroboration, a 
letter written by one officer to being written by another and changing the date.78 
 
Benjamin Cleveland 
 
 The picture that has come down to us of Cleveland, Colonel of the Wilkes 
County NC revolutionary militia, is very much as painted by Draper, who maintains 
that he was quite justifiably 'the terror of terrors' to all Tories but to all others 'the 
jolly "Old Roundabout" of the Yadkin', a sobriquet derived from the name of his 
plantation.  Examples of a succession of American writers who have followed suit 
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are Landrum, Crouch, Ashe, Hickerson and Russell.  I myself on the other hand, 
based on evidence that Draper himself provides, supplemented by Ferguson's own 
comments, suggest that his barbarous conduct was far too excessive and betrayed in 
him a marked streak of sadism.79 
 
Thomas Polk 
 
 Having previously served as Colonel of the 4th North Carolina Continental 
Regiment, Polk went on to become the commissary in charge of supplying both the 
North Carolina and southern Continental forces in 1780.  While otherwise relating 
well known facts about him, my biographical note treads new ground by drawing 
on the CP to suggest that he may have had in mind becoming a traitor to the 
revolutionary cause.80  Although Polk is described in the Dictionary of American 
Biography as 'a zealous patriot', other works have pointed out that Gates considered 
his conduct suspicious at this time, but no concrete evidence has been forthcoming, 
and certainly none as damning as that set out in the CP.81 
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How historians have made use of the CP to date 
 
 As I have previously explained, the CP was not widely publicised and took 
some time to become broadly disseminated among historians.  It was not until 2012 
that works relying in part on it began to be published.  This being so, we still await a 
detailed and comprehensive history of the southern campaigns as re-evaluated in 
the light of the CP, and perhaps it is premature to expect that one should have 
surfaced by now.  Instead, we have monographs, biographies and articles making 
use of it, including in some instances my commentary, and I have cited examples.  
Sherman, for instance, voluminously makes use of both, but almost entirely in cross-
references, setting out in his introduction the reason for this approach:  "So much 
information does [Saberton's] six-volume work contain that it was frankly 
impossible under the circumstances to have incorporated in our own as much of it as 
we would have liked."82 
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PART 3 
Was the war in the south winnable by the British?83 
 
 As I seek to demonstrate in this Part, Britain's grand strategy for reducing the 
southern colonies was at least in part sound and it may well have achieved a lasting 
measure of success if only Clinton and Cornwallis had played their cards right.84  
How and  why it  went wrong are the questions that I shall first address. 
 
 The cardinal sins were initially to underestimate to a gross extent the number 
of troops needed for prosecuting the campaigns, to misjudge the continued 
pacification of conquered territory, to omit taking into account the likely nature of 
the war should pacification not succeed, and to fail to improvise tactics accordingly 
― all contrary to Clausewitz's first rule of war85. 
 
 Of the number of troops left with Cornwallis ― on which historians widely 
diverge ― Mackesy provides a convincing account that 6,753 effectives remained in 
South Carolina and 1,706 in Georgia, of whom 4,870 and 1,259 were respectively fit 
for duty.86  The upshot was that while posts at Camden, Cheraw Hill, the village of 
Ninety Six and Augusta were established, there were, apart from the troops at 
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Camden, precious few to control the vast hinterlands given the need to maintain the 
posts themselves.  So the opportunity was there, which the revolutionaries seized, to 
regroup unopposed and to commence what became the insurgency.  Far better to 
suppress it before it developed, but there were too few troops to do so.87 
 
 As far as pacification is concerned, experience soon proved that in a politically 
polarised situation lenity was not the answer.  Short of admitting failure, the only 
solution was to adopt a policy of deterrence, but none was in the main adopted by 
Cornwallis and in any event, to be effective, it would have had to depend on an 
adequate number of troops to back it up.88 
 
 Then there were the loyalists, who according to Robert Gray, a most 
percipient commentator, constituted 50 per cent of the Backcountry population.  
Over the past five years they had been brutally repressed by the revolutionary 
authorities and demanded retribution.  By not providing it ― except to exile certain 
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deposed officers and officials to the sea islands for other reasons ― the British 
alienated their friends without winning over their enemies.89 
 
 As respects the likely nature of the war should pacification not succeed, the 
British had a wealth of experience in meeting with aroused irregular opposition, for 
example at Concord and Lexington, and not least in the comprehensive defeat of 
Burgoyne.  Wherever the British campaigned, it had become a fact of life.  This being 
so, it was naive to assume that it would not break out in the south and to fail to plan 
ahead.  In the plains and open woodlands there, the key to defeating irregulars was 
mounted troops, as Hanger himself explained, but the only ones Cornwallis was left 
with were the British Legion and a detachment of the 17th Light Dragoons.  Their 
numbers were totally inadequate for such a job.90  As Robson succinctly put it, 'The 
British, hidebound by their European background, never improvised sufficiently.'91  
Without improvisation and adaptation to American conditions they were in no 
position to succeed. 
 
                                                 
89
   It is, I think, unnecessary for me to expatiate on deterrence except to assert a perhaps self-evident 
and simple fact, namely that a principal purpose is to deter by threat or way of punishment actions or 
omissions of a particularly injurious nature.  As to retributive justice, it embraces in its classical form 
the idea that the amount of punishment should be proportionate to the amount of harm caused by 
criminally offensive behaviour.  Despite criticism in recent years the concept remains a central pillar 
of the criminal law ― even today, and it is perhaps right that it should be so, for, if individuals begin 
to believe that society is unwilling or unable to impose penalties commensurate with injurious acts, 
then seeds of anarchy and vigilante justice are sown.  Indeed, it was the lack of retributive justice that 
impelled many loyalists to seek vengeance on their enemies, thereby adding to the disorder in the 
Backcountry.  As to loyalism there, see Gray, 'Observations', pp. 140, 148. 
90   "The crackers and militia in those parts of America are all mounted on horseback, which renders it 
totally impossible to force them to an engagement with infantry only.  When they chuse to fight, they 
dismount and fasten their horses to the fences and rails; but if not very confident in the superiority of 
their numbers, they remain on horseback, give their fire, and retreat, which renders it useless to attack 
them without cavalry, for though you repulse them and drive them from the field, you can never 
improve the advantage or do them any material detriment," Hanger, An Address, p. 82.  See also CP, 
vol. II, p. 34. 
91   Robson, American Revolution, p. 99.  
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 And so, as 1780 progressed, a combination of the above factors led the British 
to control neither the entire eastern part of South Carolina by the close of the 
summer nor, with the defeat of Ferguson, almost the whole of the Backcountry by 
the close of the year. 
 
 Finally, when reviewing what went wrong, we need to take into account 
Cornwallis's precipitate invasions of North Carolina without first consolidating 
control of South Carolina and Georgia in line with Clinton's instructions, matters 
extensively addressed in my commentary92; his continuance of the second invasion 
after the defeat at Cowpens93; and his absurd decision at Wilmington to forsake the 
provinces to the south and march into Virginia, another matter that my commentary 
extensively addresses94.  Yet, as I shall now explain, the British might have achieved 
a lasting measure of success, notwithstanding the limited number of troops available 
in North America. 
 
 Admittedly, Clinton was naturally concerned about the arrival of the French 
expeditionary force and the threat posed to New York, but wars are won, not by 
cautious, hesitant commanders, but by those who are prepared to take risks.  Instead 
of taking some 4,500 troops with him to New York, he should have left them with 
Cornwallis in keeping with the primacy of the southern strategy.  Well garrisoned 
with some 15,500 effectives, of whom some 10,000 were fit for duty, New York 
                                                 
92   See, for example, CP, vol. II, pp. 32-3. 
93   By destroying his extensive train of baggage and provisions he was perforce unable, unless 
resupplied, to remain in the back parts of North Carolina, a prerequisite if the loyalists were to 
embody.  It almost beggars belief that, with the North Carolinians in Hamilton's corps available to 
advise, his intelligence was so poor as not to indicate that the only means of resupply, by water from 
Wilmington to Cross Creek, was impractical. 
94   CP, vol. IV, pp. 101-03. 
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should have been able to hold out if attacked, and in any event till reinforced from 
the south. 
 
 With such an accretion of force Cornwallis would ― perhaps at once, as 
seems inevitable ― have assigned it to the Backcountry, maybe half to Ninety Six 
and half to the east of South Carolina, thereby providing badly needed support for 
the royal militia and deterring the revolutionary irregulars from regrouping.  Of 
particular value would have been the Queen's Rangers, though, for the reasons I 
have described, a wise decision would have been to supplement them, the British 
Legion, and the detachment of the 17th with mounted troops formed from the 
infantry.  Such an arrangement would have made it unnecessary to call up Cruger's 
and Allen's corps from Georgia, leaving the troops there to police the interior and 
perhaps add ― marginally ― to Brown's at Augusta, where, among other things, 
they would have provided more support for Grierson's regiment of royal militia. 
 
 A sufficiency of troops to police both provinces was, however, only part of the 
equation.  If pacification was to be maintained or ultimately succeed, those of the 
revolutionary persuasion had to be convinced that the consequences of taking up 
arms were greater than the alternative of remaining peaceably at home, where they 
would have to supply only a measure of provisions in lieu of their enrolment in the 
royal militia.  So, apart from allowing them to occupy their property peaceably, 
pacification ultimately depended on deterrence, first on effectively suppressing 
outbreaks of resistance, using if necessary the kind of tactics I have outlined, and 
second on imposing severe sanctions for either taking up arms or breaking paroles 
or oaths of allegiance ―  but deterrence would work only if there were sufficient 
troops to ensure that most transgressors were caught and punished.  Of course, 
whenever a nascent insurgency may develop, there is always a fine line to be drawn 
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between obtaining the desired effect with deterrent measures and going too far with 
them, thereby provoking the outcome that they were meant to forestall.  Yet, all in 
all, the option of effective deterrence had to be tried here, for there was no other 
besides lenity, which, as matters soon proved, stood no chance of success.  As 
Robson aptly remarked of British strategy throughout the war, 'The results of 
following the conciliatory point of view were generally disastrous.' 95 
 
 As to the severe sanctions available to the British,  they were in fact few, and 
not long-term imprisonment, for the facilities were not there, the Provost in 
Charlestown being overflowing.  In Georgia the position was even worse.  In the 
case of those who revolted against the reinstatement of the King's peace, but were 
not subject to paroles or oaths of allegiance, there was a measure available that has 
had a long pedigree.  It was adopted by Wemyss, as sanctioned by Cornwallis, when 
he burned the plantations of those to the east who had taken up arms.  I say 'a long 
pedigree' advisedly, for the destruction of homes in like circumstances was, for 
example, sanctioned by the British in Palestine, where the legislation was kept on the 
Statute Book by the State of Israel, which controversially uses it to the present day.  
Made under article 6 of the Palestine (Defence) Order in Council 1937, regulation 
119(1) of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations 1945 says:  'A military commander 
may by order direct the forfeiture to the Government of Palestine of any house, 
structure or land from which he has reason to suspect that any firearm has been 
illegally discharged, or any bomb, grenade or explosive or incendiary article illegally 
thrown, or of any house, structure or land situated in any area, town, village, quarter 
or street the inhabitants or some of the inhabitants of which he is satisfied have 
committed, or attempted to commit, or abetted the commission of, or been 
                                                 
95   Robson, American Revolution, p. 118. 
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accessories after the fact of the commission of, any offence against the Regulations 
involving violence or intimidation or any Military Court offence; and when any 
house, structure or land is forfeited as aforesaid, the military commander may 
destroy the house or the structure or anything growing on the land.'  As for breaking 
paroles or oaths of allegiance, the ultimate sanction, on conviction by court martial, 
was sentence of death.  Yet, as we have seen, such sentences were at times 
commuted by Cornwallis, lessening their deterrent effect (see p. 44, note 88), 
whereas Germain on the contrary, as evinced by his letter of 9 November, appeared 
to favour their being generally carried out, seemingly convinced, as he was, of their 
deterrent value (CP, vol. III, p. 45).  
 
 If pacification were to succeed, a firm grip had to be taken by Cornwallis on 
plundering by his troops, alienating, as it did, his friends and propelling his enemies 
to take up arms. 
 
 Pacification would have taken a much longer period than Cornwallis was 
prepared to allow.  As I have observed elsewhere, "Festina lente!" was the maxim for 
success.96  If the measures I have outlined had been implemented, there seems a 
reasonable prospect that South Carolina and Georgia would have been eventually 
restored to the King's peace in reality as well as in name, perhaps with the 
reinstatement of South Carolina's constitution as favoured by Germain.  Only then 
should thoughts have turned to pursuing the overall strategy to the northward.   
How it may have been done, and where the troops may have come from, are 
questions that I shall now address. 
 
                                                 
96   CP, vol. II, p. 32; see also Mackesy, 'Could the British have won?' p. 19. 
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 It would have been folly to remove troops from South Carolina and Georgia, 
opening the door to the breaking out of an insurgency there, and none for a time 
would have been available from New York, assuming Clinton had not taken a 
material detachment with him when he left the south.  The answer would have lain 
in the troop reinforcements arriving at New York in October 1780 and at 
Charlestown and New York in June and July 1781, together amounting to 8,500 men.  
Instead of being frittered away on diversionary expeditions like Arnold's and 
Phillips' ― expeditions that had no effect whatever on the overall strategy of moving 
northwards from the south, they could have been consolidated for the invasion of 
North Carolina. 
 
 In a convincing memorandum of extraordinary strategic significance, one 
entirely overlooked by historians, Hector MacAlester explains why the invasion of 
North Carolina should be mounted, not from the south, which would not solve the 
problem of maintaining the troops in the back parts, but from the north ― from 
bases in Petersburg and Halifax, which would not only obviate that problem but 
force the Continental southern army to withdraw lest it be caught in a pincer 
movement.97 
 
 As to Virginia, it would remain, at least for the time being, a step too far.98 
 
 It remains for me to summarise how I envisage the war may have ended.  As 
Clausewitz pertinently put it, 'Not every war need be fought till one side collapses... 
                                                 
97   CP, vol. IV, pp. 138-39. 
98  In another compelling plan (CP, vol. VI, pp. 206-08) Hector MacAlester explains how a conquest of 
Virginia may be put in train.  The troops should not of course have come from those invading North 
Carolina or possessing the provinces to its south, which it would remain a folly to remove, but rather 
from further reinforcements sent out by Britain ― a prospect, perhaps not at present, but certain if 
peace with France and Spain, which was on the cards, were concluded.  
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in war many roads lead to success and they do not all involve the opponent's 
outright defeat,' ― the most important of these being to wear the enemy down.99  
With North Carolina conquered, Virginia threatened next, and France and Spain 
vacillating about a continuance of the war, there was a reasonable prospect that the 
remaining colonies would have accepted an accommodation short of independence, 
one giving them all they had sought before hostilities commenced.  So, responding 
to the question posed in the heading of this Part, I conclude ― like Mackesy, but for 
wider reasons ― that the answer was 'Yes'.100 
 
                                                 
99   Clausewitz, On War, pp. 33-7. 
100  As Wright remarks, the reasons for the British failure have remained elusive, a gap that this Part 
seeks to fill as respects the war in the south (Wright, Fabric of Freedom, pp. 107-08).  Of reasons 
advanced by historians too numerous to name, they are to a degree encapsulated by Shy, who refers 
to the fact that groups of revolutionary irregulars could not be eliminated; loyalists could not 
therefore be protected, so were less inclined to commit themselves; civilians were roughly treated by 
Cornwallis's troops, which, together with Clinton's proclamation of 3 June 1780, led dormant 
revolutionaries to take up arms; and many loyalists, infuriated at the lack of retributive justice, took 
matters into their own hands (John Shy, 'The American Revolution: The Military Conflict Considered 
as a Revolutionary War', in Stephen G Kurtz and James H Hutson (eds.), Essays on the American 
Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973), p. 142; idem, A People Numerous and 
Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1976), pp. 211-13).  Other historians consistently refer to plundering by regulars and to the 
harshness of the pacification policy pursued by Cornwallis, whereas I myself conclude that, apart 
from plundering, his policy was too lenient.  A number, like myself, are of opinion that his troops 
were spread too thinly but they do not provide the supporting detail that I do.  A few refer to the folly 
of continuing the autumn campaign after Cowpens but hardly any conclude, as I do, that a hold on 
South Carolina and Georgia could have been maintained if Cornwallis had not marched into Virginia 
(CP, vol. IV, p. 102).  Overall, it has fallen to me to coalesce these disparate strands into a 
comprehensive critique of what appears to me to have essentially gone wrong. 
 
Besides the above, an original contribution to history is my analysis of the way in which the southern 
strategy could have been successfully pursued by the British and the war eventually won.  Of British 
historians, Robson and Wright conclude that the war had effectively been lost by the close of 1778, 
whereas Mackesy takes the view that peace with France and Spain, which was in prospect, would 
have ultimately led to an end of the war in Britain's favour (Robson, American Revolution, p. 114; 
Wright, supra, p. 128; Mackesy, 'Could the British have won?' pp. 23-4, 28).  I on the other hand 
explicitly explain how the end may have come about. 
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 To summarise, publication of the CP, including my commentary and 
footnotes in it, provides a mass of information on both the southern campaigns and 
the actors in them, information previously unavailable to, or not easily accessible by, 
historians and in itself a significant contribution to the field.  Yet far more important 
is that publication has also opened the door, as evinced by my commentary, 
footnotes and this essay, to material re-evaluations, not only of individual actors and 
events, but also of the overall conduct of the campaigns and of the strategy and 
tactics employed.  Not only will future historians use the six volumes as primary 
sources but almost inevitably they will be led to reconceptualise the Revolutionary 
War in the light of the original contributions to history that I have made. 
 
_________________________________ 
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